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Social Security
SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR

By Eric A. Camman
The federal social-security act of 1935 has not yet registered
in the public consciousness to a degree commensurate with its
epochal nature and importance. It is not frequently found among
the headlines on the front pages of the newspapers but is over
shadowed by more prominent developments in domestic news
such as the A.A.A., the T.V.A. and the current politics. The
average citizen, no doubt, is disposed to a general acceptance of
the objectives, especially aid to dependent children, maternal and
child welfare, public health, aid to the blind and help for the
unemployed. He knows that new taxes will be required to pay
the cost of these humane projects, but beyond this he has no clear
understanding of the program for carrying them out. The re
quirements will not touch him individually, until he begins to
pay his new taxes, and the full import of what is now planned
lies far in the future. The citizen of that day when the system
now getting under way is to be entirely in operation, who will be
subject to its benefits and burdens, is now too young to be inter
ested. But business men, actuaries, economists, accountants
and others who have watched the development of the social
security movement and who have studied the features of the
present law are concerned over some of these features and their
implications.
The act is unique, not alone because it introduces into our polity
new or newly recognized concepts of social responsibility, but as
well because it is a tax measure upon a very large scale, involving
a new tax base and the obtainment and management of stupen
dous sums of money over a period, not of years, but of generations.
The stated objectives in themselves are broad, and the possible
effects and consequences are far-reaching.
The total annual cost of the present scope of activities is not
apparent, but it may be expected to be in keeping with the size
of the undertaking. At the time that this is being written there
is much interest in and discussion of the president’s suggestion
for new taxes of some one-half billion dollars. Little is said of
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the taxes arising out of the existing social-security act, which
begin at something above one-half billion dollars, and eventually
may amount to seven billion dollars a year, if conservative esti
mates, made later, are reasonable.
The seven billion dollars a year, of course, is in addition to what
it may be costing to run the government and extraordinary relief,
if such there be, at the time.
It would be a mistaken idea to regard the federal social-security
act as merely another piece of “new deal” legislation and, if one
happen not to be a “new-dealer,” to hope that the supreme court
will upset it. We shall have the subject with us from now on.
If we had not had this act we should soon have had another.
Some such legislation was inevitable. The major depression has
emphasized the social problems of our economic system. The
hardships through which we have gone and with which we are
still struggling have brought to the front questions of social
equity and “rights” which can not be answered by denials or
by mere indifference. Want is not satisfied by pointing out the
pitfalls on the road to easy plenty, and the desire for security for
oneself and one’s own is too closely akin to instinct to be sup
pressed easily by general condemnation of programs or motives.
Too many banks have closed with losses of savings; too many
investments have shrunk with the disappearance of income; and
too many jobs have been lost by persons who were thrown upon
inadequate resources through no fault of their own, to maintain
unshaken a belief in the old principle of thrift and the virtue of
individual effort. They proved to be of little help against over
whelming odds.
When we remember this, it is nothing to wonder about that we
have masses of people believing in “share the wealth” move
ments, notwithstanding the obvious impracticability of dividing
the national wealth among the population. Some have a great
deal—why should not all have some? Nor is it marvelous in
these circumstances that thousands of people—perhaps millions
by now—fervently sing “Onward, pension soldiers” and march
believingly forward toward the time when all over sixty will re
ceive $200 a month from the government, never doubting that the
means will be found somehow under the Townsend plan.* It
will not be strange to find others, for whom the age of sixty is
still beyond the summit, placing their faith in different plans,
* The Townsend Plan: Taxing far Sixty; Nicholas Roosevelt; Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.
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like the Ezekiel plan to provide work for all at $2,500 a year,
for example.
*
Call these things idle dreams, foolish schemes, or what you will,
but do not laugh them off as having no significance. They can
be stopped only by recognizing the potential forces which exist,
by facing the problems in a constructive attitude, devoting our
best abilities to the development of a program along sound lines,
toward an alleviation if not a remedy for situations which may
become intolerable. This is not merely a social responsibility.
It is a national necessity, having in mind the possibility that if a
wholesome program is not found, some fantastic one such as
those mentioned will prevail at last.
In the presence of these considerations the 1935 act challenges
thought. Manifestly it is only a beginning. Great Britain has
had thirty-five laws or changes in unemployment laws in twentyfive years.† Undoubtedly we shall have to make changes in ours.
The number that we shall have to make and the cost of our ex
perimentation will depend upon the sincerity and care with which
we study the subject. The purpose of this article is to analyze,
from this point of view, the more important features of the act.
Are they sound in principle? Are they appropriate in scope?
Are they justifiable in cost? Are they practical in administra
tion? If not, what is to be done about it?
The analysis can comprise only the main proposals in these
pages at a single attempt. We might first regard the law as a
whole, estimate its effects and its cost, and then take up each one
of its major parts (of which there are really only four) to weigh
the probabilities and possibilities in it.
Regarding the law as a whole, legal opinion seems to be divided
upon the question of constitutionality, with rather a leaning
against than for.‡ It is not for a layman to judge with assurance
the weight of either argument, or how much that which is opposed
may be influenced by wishful thinking.
It suffices to repeat that whichever way the debate may go on
the present act, the fundamental problems remain to be solved.
If the act is upheld the program will either have to be carried out
or modified in future. If the act is declared unconstitutional,
* $2500 a Year, Mordecai Ezekiel; Harcourt, Brace & Co.
† Unemployment Insurance—Monograph 1, Policyholders Service Bureau, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, p. 23.
‡ The Federal Social Security Act, B. N. Armstrong; American Bar Association Journal,
December 1935; p. 786. Also, Legal Opinion in the Majority Report to the Legislature of the
State of New Jersey by the State Commission on Social Security; January 18, 1936.
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what follows depends in no small degree upon how well the issues
and objects are understood. Let us examine the present law.
The act has eleven titles, or chapters, separating its various
provisions. They need not be recapitulated here. It will be
more helpful to give a summary of their meaning, free of legal
phraseology and all the incidental detail. The main features
provide for:

1. Old age monthly pensions for employees in certain occupa
tions who reach 65 years of age and retire.
2. Unemployment compensation for employees in certain
occupations who are out of work, with machinery for finding
suitable jobs for them in private employ or, failing that, after
compensation is exhausted, in public works.
3. Funds for social service toward the welfare of mothers and
children, of the blind, of the public health and of needy aged
persons who do not come under the category first above men
tioned.
4. Administration of the foregoing allotments and disburse
ments, as well as research and advice upon policies and legislation
in the field of social welfare.

Stripped of all technicalities, these are the four principal parts
of the proposed program. In reality the activities are only three,
namely, old-age pensions, unemployment compensation and state
grants-in-aid, with administration pertinent to and part of the
three; but in view of the scale and importance of administration
it appears desirable to list it as a major part.
The taxes, assessed in the taxing clauses ostensibly for general
revenue but practically by implication and tacitly by the history
of the law for effectuating most of the program, are at ascending
rates during the next fourteen years. They may be summarized
as follows:
Summary of tax rates in the federal social
security act of 1935
Per cent. of payroll
Unemployment Old-age benefit
compensation
tax on all em
tax on employ ployers and em
ers of 8 or more ployees divided
equally (A) (B) Total
persons (B)
1936......................................................... 1%
1%
1937......................................................... 2%
4%
2%
1938, 39................................................... 3%
2%
5%
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1940,
1943,
1946,
1949,

41, 42........................
44, 45........................
47, 48........................
et seq.........................

...................
...................
...................
...................

3%
3%
3%
3%

3%
4%
5%
6%

6%
7%
8%
9%

" ----- -

(A) Omitting any pay over $3,000 per annum.
(B) Covering employment excepting certain occupations.
text.)

(See following

The tax basis is payrolls for employees in certain occupational
classes, which in substance are identified by excepting agricultural
employment, domestic service in private homes, government
employees, railroad employees (as to pensions), vessel crews and
employees of non-profit organizations. Using the census figures
of 1930, it is estimated that some 26 million out of 49 million
gainfully occupied workers would be covered—about 53%.
These figures are subject to adjustment for various reasons, but
it will do to understand that the provisions apply to about half
the working population, that is to say, for the old-age benefit and
unemployment compensation parts of the program. For the
state grants-in-aid, the classification and the coverage are de
termined by need, including needy old age assistance for those
who are not eligible under the old-age benefit plan.
The maximum ultimate tax rate in most cases is 9%, of which,
generally speaking, the employer pays 6% and the employee 3%.
Dire predictions are being made by writers in technical and other
publications of the devastating effects which these taxes will have
upon costs, upon prices and upon industries. These predictions
are in the public service if they will arouse interest by sounding
an alarm. Some of them are overdrawn or beside the major
points. It is contended, for example, that the payroll taxes will
have such a pyramiding effect that the 6% levied upon employers
will ultimately grow to be 10% and 15% in price advances by
being passed along. The contention is incorrect as to price
behavior. It is sufficiently plausible, however, to demand con
siderable attention, and for that reason it will be worth while to
demonstrate the fallacy in it. This can be done by a simple
arithmetical calculation.
Let us assume products passing from one to another through
five processes involving varying proportions of labor in their
costs. The products may be anything, and the figures may be
hypothetical.
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I. Original proportions of the sales dollar for various products passing through
successive processes of manufacture and distribution
12
3
4
Materials
Net profit
Sales
All
and
labor
overhead
% Amount price
10 $ .10 $ 1.00
First process................. ............. $ .10 $ .80
.13
.54
8
1.67
Second process............. .............
1.00
.50
4.21
2.04 12
Third process................ .............
1.67
9.82
4
.58
14.61
4.21
Fourth process............. .............
1.17
3.65
6
19.43
14.61
Fifth process................. .............

$2.48

$16.85

Total.....................

These figures represent (1) existing costs of materials and over
head (supplies, etc. and fixed charges) combined, (2) the existing
cost of labor, direct and indirect, including manufacture and dis
tribution, (3) the per cent. and amount of net profit and (4)
the selling price.
Let us assume further that each manufacturer pays his 6% tax
upon labor and passes his entire increased cost along to the next
manufacturer or converter, including an increased profit sufficient
to maintain his original percentage of profit upon sales. The
figures then would be altered as follows:
II. Price levels of products after passing along 6% payroll taxes and maintaining former profit percentages
8
9
6
7
5
Materials
Price
All
and
Net profit
Sales index
overhead labor (c)
% Amount price
(b)
(a)
First process........... ........... $ .10 $ .85 10 $ .10 $ 1.05 1.053
1.05
.57 8
.14
1.76 1.056
Second process........ ............
4.46 1.059
1.76
2.16 12
.54
Third process.......... ...........
15.49 1.06
.62
4.46
10.41 4
Fourth process........ ...........
20.59 1.06
15.49
3.87 6 1.23
Fifth process.......... ............
Total................

$17.86

$2.63

Increase over (I). ..

1.01

.15

Increase in final sales price
over (I)................

1.16

(a) At preceding increased sales price.
(b) At 1.06 to include tax.
(c) Ratio to previously existing sales price.
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These figures indicate the result after each manufacturer has
paid for his materials and overhead at the increased prices of
predecessors (5). The overhead represents supplies, etc., pre
sumably subject to the same effect as materials. It also includes
fixed charges, presumably not so subject, which however are
ignored for simplicity.
All indirect labor usually included in overhead is included for
this purpose under labor. The labor cost (6) increases by the
amount of the taxes at 6%, and then added to the increased
material cost, with an amount of profit sufficient to maintain
the original percentage (7), results in the increased price levels to
successors (8). It will be seen that the price level increase does
not exceed 6% (9).
This is a lengthy way of saying that the payroll taxes of 6%, if
universally advanced, could only result in a price advance of 6%.
If all costs and profits change from 100 to 106, the resulting price
level becomes 106.
On the other hand, the example also illustrates (in an intention
ally simple manner) what will happen if the burden is so passed
along: the final purchaser pays the total taxes plus profit increases.
The price he pays has advanced only 6%, but there has been ac
cumulated in it $1.01 in aggregate taxes and 15 cents in added
profits. In this respect the basis approximates a sales tax, but
with an important distinction, namely, that a sales tax is automatic
and geometric in advancement, whereas the payroll tax is not.
The assumption in these calculations that all the taxes will be
passed along and that a profit will be added thereon is improbable.
We must take into account many other factors which may have
a bearing upon price action. The restraints arising from com
petition within an industry and between industries will remain
(let us hope) and will tend to retard prices. In turn, technological
advances will be made, stimulated in part by the threat of heavy
drain on profits. Increase in volume would have a strong
influence upon a reduction in price. All these are interrelated,
but all of them would tend to compensate for the taxes to some
extent and all of them taken together in the happiest combination
would markedly lower prices. The same influences naturally
apply to purchasing power.
It is held that the new taxes will have the effect of seriously
reducing purchasing power, that if prices advance to the level of
106 and the income of employees drops to the level of 97 (because
257
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of the 3% tax on employees) the resulting effect upon purchasing
power might be to bring it down to the level 91.5 (97/106). Such
a conclusion is not warranted, for the reason given, namely that
the probable effect of compensating factors is ignored.
The case really is that it is impossible to predict definitely the
effect of the new taxes upon prices, without at the same time eval
uating a number of unknowns that are difficult to resolve. Any
such forecasts, therefore, are mainly conjecture.
Probably the new taxes at first will have a depressant effect,
the degree of which can not be reckoned. But unless we are to
remain henceforth in our present position of growth we can not
reason that the whole burden must come out of income at present
levels. Until we abandon all hope and faith in further progress
we may expect compensating impulses to counter and reduce
the burden of the taxes. Argument against the proposed pro
gram directed solely or mainly at presumed ill effects upon
prices and purchasing power is not convincing.
There is more to the argument that the incidence of the taxes
is unequal because in some industries the proportion of labor in
cost is small, whereas in others it is high. The taxes will fall
upon the latter with greater weight, to such an extent, it is held,
that in some industries in which profit now is slim all profit will
be taken up by the taxes.
The extent to which profits are affected again will depend some
what upon the factors already mentioned, but it is evident that
the payroll tax basis introduces new problems of adjustment
between small-labor-cost enterprises and large-labor-cost enter
prises in competing industries. When the enterprises are in the
same industry the problems already exist, but they will be aggra
vated unless the taxes are uniformly passed along. In both
cases the effect would be to narrow competitive differentials
with the advantage in favor of the small-labor-cost operator.
It is perplexing to see how to get around this obstacle, because
a resort to steps in tax rates according to labor cost percentages,
aside from the practical difficulties, would only be equivalent to
assessing the taxes at lower rates upon total costs, and this would
be inching still closer to a sales tax.
We found in the processing taxes that inter-industry adjust
ments were troublesome, yet in that attempt the elements were
simpler. Hence we may expect no easy task in getting the kinks
out of the payroll taxes.
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These objections, however, do not appear sufficient to support
a judgment against the whole program or such parts of it as are
sustainable on adequate grounds. Other countries have carried
on such social measures (although, it should be said, on a lesser
scale) without bringing privation to whole industries and op
pression to all business; hence we may expect to find a way
through to do what we have to do.
Leaving the questions of tax rates with these observations, we
may proceed to examine the total tax bill which we shall be called
upon to foot.
Appropriations are authorized in the various titles of the act
to carry out specific purposes. The amounts of these appropria
tions aggregate about 100 million dollars for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1936, and thereafter about 150 million dollars a year (see
schedule “1”). These figures, however, do not at all indicate the
total cost of the program. They include only 50 million dollars
for old-age assistance to states, which ultimately would be far
short of the necessary amount. They include only 49 million
dollars for the federal apportionment to states toward defraying
the expenses of unemployment compensation administration,
which will not be enough, if 5% of total revenues is a fair allow
ance for administration. The expense of the old-age benefit
plan also is not included.
The full financial import of the program becomes evident
only when one considers the total revenues in future years
upon the present terms. The figures contained in the report
of the senate finance committee, May 20, 1935,* which are per
haps the best figures publicly available at this time, show that the
total tax revenues are estimated to run about as follows:
Estimated total tax revenues under the federal social-security act of 1935
(Millions of dollars)
Adminis Total tax
Funds tration
revenues
1,546
1940....................................................................
1,410
136
2,785
1950 ....................................................................
2,600
185
3,028
1960....................................................................
2,827
201
3,272
1970....................................................................
3,055
217
3,405
1980....................................................................
3,180
225

These estimates are of annual revenues at the respective times
to be derived from the payroll taxes set in the act (schedule “ 2 ”).
* Senate.
Bill.

Calendar 661.

Report No. 668 to accompany H. R. 7260.
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They still do not indicate the probable total annual costs,
which, as previously stated, in 1980 may run to seven billion
dollars a year for maintaining the present program without any
additional ventures.
We have first the grants-in-aid to states. According to the
appropriations which have been mentioned (schedule “1”), and
omitting for the time being any old-age assistance, these will
cost at the outset some 50 million dollars. This estimate does
not include the shares which the states must raise, in some cases
one-half and in others two-thirds. Taking these into account,
as well as the probability of increases, we may set down for state
grants at least $150,000,000.
For unemployment compensation it is estimated that the 90%
share authorized to be remitted in the federal act, if full advantage
is taken of it by all states, in 1980 will amount to about $1,000,000,000 (schedule “2”).
The annual tax collections for the old-age benefit plan in 1980
are estimated to be $2,180,000,000 (schedule “2”). To this we
must add about $1,000,000,000 for the interest on federal securi
ties, in which the retirement reserve is to be invested, which must
come out of general taxation (as later explained) making a total
of $3,180,000,000.
A budget must be estimated for needy old-age assistance, that
is to say, for federal grants to states of one-half the cost, and for
state tax collections of the other half of the cost, of supporting
aged persons who are not eligible to the old-age benefit plan.
According to the calculation made elsewhere in this article there
may be about six million aged persons in 1980 who can not draw
federal pensions and who must look to the states for assistance.
Computed at the modest rate of $400 per annum their assistance
would cost $2,520,000,000, including 5% for administration.
Finally, for the costs of administration we have the estimate
(schedule “2”), of $225,000,000.
To recapitulate, the annual cost in 1980 may amount to:
State grants program...............................................................
Unemployment compensation program..................................
Federal old-age benefit program..............................................
State old-age assistance............................................................
Administration..........................................................................

$ 150,000,000
1,000,000,000
3,180,000,000
2,520,000,000
225,000,000

Total, before allowance for contingencies.......................

$7,075,000,000

260

Social Security

These estimates, of course, are in 1936 dollars. How heavy
the burden will be is problematical; presumably, the estimates of
revenue include allowance for an increase in average per-capita
earnings. Many of us who are struggling to comprehend the
possible consequences of the social-security program will not be
here to witness its fruition, so we can not divine whether 7 billion
dollars will be much money in 1980 or not. Seven billion dollars
looms large within recollection of a national income of 45 billions.
But if the rate of growth in national income in the next 44 years
is anything like what it was during the 20 years from 1909 to 1928
*
the national income may be 170 billions in 1980, even after due
deflation to express real purchasing power. Who can tell?
Cheerful optimism, however, as to the relative cost in the blue
haze of the future of obligations to which we are now commit
ting our children in the name of security is a rather insecure basis
for the undertaking. We should carefully consider our policy.
Let us take up now each part of the program, starting with the
old-age benefit plan, which is the most important and fraught
with the most important uncertainties.
The Old-Age Benefit Plan

The gist of the federal old-age pension plan is:
Employees who retire upon reaching the age of 65 shall receive
monthly pensions from the federal government. The only
qualifications are that $2,000 shall have been earned in five years
in occupations not exempted, the exemptions being, in substance,
agricultural labor, domestic service, government employees, rail
road employees, vessel crews, employees of non-profit organiza
tions and casual labor.
The amount of the pension per month is related to the total
wages earned until retirement at 65, at ½% of the first $3,000 plus
1/12% of the next $42,000 and
of any over $42,000, with
a maximum pension at $85 a month. In effect the pension per
annum would amount to 6% of the first $3,000, plus 1% of the
next $42,000 and ½% of any earnings over $42,000 (see chart I).
A death benefit of 3½% of earnings is prescribed, to be paid, less
any pensions which have been paid, to the decedent’s estate.
The money to pay the pensions is to be accumulated by the
annuity method in a retirement reserve, which is to be maintained
* The National Income and Its Purchasing Power, Willford Isbell King, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc. 1930.
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on an actuarial basis at 3% per annum. The necessary amounts
are to be appropriated from the treasury (practically they are to
come from the payroll taxes).
The reserve is to be invested exclusively in federal securities
to earn not less than 3% interest, the interest being increment to
the reserve. According to the estimates contained in the report
of the senate finance committee, May 20, 1935, the reserve is
expected to grow as follows:
Federal old-age benefit reserve plan
(Billions of dollars)
For the
fiscal
year
ending
June 30
1940.............................
1945.............................
1950.............................
1960.............................
1970.............................
1980.............................

.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................

Appro
Balance
priation Interest
in
on
Benefit
for
reserve reserve payments reserve
0.02
2.0
0.04
0.7
6.9
0.19
1.1
0.17
14.0
0.51
0.37
1.8
0.84
29.5
1.9
1.38
41.4
2.1
1.21
2.30
46.9
3.51
1.41
2.2

The appropriations to the reserve are somewhat less than the
revenue estimated from taxes, the difference presumably being
allowed for administration (see schedule “2”). In 1980 the
amount of the reserve is estimated to be about 47 billion dollars,
at which point we may assume the principal of the fund will re
main constant, the interest plus the current tax revenue sufficing
to pay the current benefits.
Leaving aside for the moment the question whether the provi
sion is adequate, let us consider the advantages and disadvantages
of the method.
The main advantages sought are employment of the annuity
principle with security of investment. Thus the funds out of
which to pay pensions are to be accumulated during the employ
ees’ working years, and the interest on the fund is to help defray
the cost.
There are many disadvantages.
The first is the accumulation of such a huge fund, which has
never been attempted before, in excess of all the reserves of all lifeinsurance companies. It was not the intention originally, ac
cording to the report of the president’s committee on economic
262
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security, to pile up any such sum. The recommendation of the
committee was for a reserve of perhaps 15 billion dollars, there
after resorting to a pay-as-you-go plan.
*
A reserve more than
three times as large greatly increases the management problem.
The management problem, moreover, is not entirely financial.
It is also political—very much so. Under the wording of the act
the tax revenues are to be collected by the treasury. The con
gress then is to appropriate the necessary amounts for the build
ing up of the reserve. The reserve, it is specified, shall be kept
upon an actuarial basis. Is it not probable that it will become a
strong temptation, as billions upon billions accumulate, to stop
appropriating and use the money for other and more pressing cur
rent requirements? What an impetus to spending this might give!
The congress has failed to appropriate the necessary amounts
to maintain the federal retirement system for civil-service em
ployees. Quoting from A. B. Gunnarson:†

“Since 1920, the federal government has been operating a
retirement system for its civil-service employees. According to
the latest audit report of the fund, the accrued liabilities of the
fund, actuarially determined, amounted to approximately $1,500,000,000, while the assets were about ⅓ of that amount. Hence,
there was, at the time of the audit, a deficiency in the fund of
almost $1,000,000,000—representing the amount which congress
would now have to appropriate to place this fund on an actuarially
sound basis.”
Is it not also probable that with so much money in hand de
mands will be encouraged for increased benefits or reduced taxes
while the treasury is flush ? Stranger things than these have hap
pened, as recently with the soldiers’ bonus, wherein government
payments to politically organized beneficiaries were concerned.
Private life-insurance companies, operating strictly upon actu
arial principles with stipulated reserves, can maintain their
solvency only because such diversions and deviations can not be
made. The government can maintain the integrity of the reserve
plan only upon the same condition.
Another question concerns the feasibility of investing 47 bil
lion dollars in government securities. This would mean fixing
the national debt at something above 47 billion dollars. Assume
* Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security; January 15, 1935, p. 30
Government Printing Office, Washington.
† Social Security Legislation and Business Costs, A. B. Gunnarson; National Association of
Cost Accountants Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 8, p. 377.
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that half of our present national debt of some 30 billions could be
“retired” by investment of old-age reserve funds. Thus 15
billions of the 47 billion old-age reserve would go into existing
securities, leaving 32 billion which must be invested in specially
issued federal securities. The situation then would be:
National debt converted into old-age reserve......................
Old-age reserve invested in new federal securities...............
Original national debt still outstanding..............................
Total..............................................................................

15
billions
32 47
“
15
"
62

“

To state this another way, the federal government under the
present plan will be committed to an ultimate liability for a
fund of 47 billion dollars plus any national debt that might be
outstanding in the hands of the public.
Furthermore, wherein lies the interest saving which is the
motive for adopting the reserve plan? The only saving is 3%
on the retired 15 billions. Another billion dollars must be raised
in current taxes to pay the interest on the increased national debt.
Beyond the serious difficulties of maintaining an actuarial
scheme of this magnitude under political management, there is
doubt of the actuarial soundness of the proposed method. First,
some of the benefit rates and the coverage were shifted between
the time when the actuarial calculations were made for the
president’s committee on economic security and the passage of
the act. Secondly, the rate of benefit is not proportional to the
rate of contribution on an annuity principle. The lowest paid
workers, that is to say those who have contributed the least,
will draw relatively greater benefits than the highest paid workers
who have contributed the most. This condition is illustrated in
chart I. Not only does the lower paid worker receive a higher
percentage of his average pay in pension than the higher paid
worker, but his rate of advancement with years of service is greater
as well. The $50 a month employee is entitled to a pension after
10 years of 35%, and after 40 years of 65%, whereas the $250
a month employee is entitled after 10 years to 15% and after 40
years to 32½%, of the monthly wages respectively.
As a consequence the following situation exists in the relation
between benefits and contributions. For employees receiving
annual wages respectively of:
$900

$1,200

$1,800
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Years
$ 50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
250

Average
Monthly
Wage

20
$22.50
27.50
32.50
37.50
42.50
47.50
51.25
53.75
56.25

40
$32.50
42.50
51.25
56.25
61.25
66.25
71.25
76.25
81.25

30
$27.50
35.00
42.50
50.00
53.75
57.50
61.25
65.00
68.75

—
10
35.0%
26.7
22.5
20.0
18.3
17.1
16.3
15.6
15.0

30
55.0%
46.7
42.5
40.0
35.8
32.9
30.6
28.9
27.5

40
65.0%
56.7
51.3
45.0
40.8
37.9
35.5
33.9
32.5

SHADED BARS - MONTHLY PENSION AFTER 10, 20, 30, 40 YEA R S

20
45.0%
36.7
32.5
30.0
28.3
27.1
25.6
23.9
22.5

Per cent of Monthly Wage

years of employment

WHITE BARS = AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGE

10
$17.50
20.00
22.50
25.00
27.50
30.00
32.50
35.00
37.50

Dollars per Month

Monthly Pension after

CHART SHOWING RELATION BETWEEN AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES AND MONTHLY
PENSIONS AFTER 10, 20, 30 AND 40 YEARS

The Journal of Accountancy

the annual contributions on the part of the employer and the
employee together at 6% per annum will be:
$54

$108

$72

$180

$144

At the end of 40 years the accumulated reserve for each employee
at 3% (that is to say the amount of an annual deposit at the end
of the year at 3% interest computed annually for 40 years) will be:
$4,072

$5,429

$8,143

$10,858

$13,572

The annual pension at the end of 40 years of employment for
each of these employees will be:

$510

$615

$735

$855

$975

The accumulated reserves are sufficient to pay these pensions
(including interest on declining balances at 3% per annum)
to each of these employees for the following number of years:

9

13

10

18

16

In each case the number of years after reaching 65 in which each
employee starts to draw out more than he himself contributed
plus 3% annual compound interest is as follows:

4½

5

6½

8

9

Having in mind that life expectancy at 65 is something over 12
years, it will be clear from the foregoing by interpolation that all
those earning less than $1,500 per annum accumulate reserves
insufficient for their life expectancy. These will be greatest in
number. The average annual income of wage and salaried em
ployees in 1932 was $1,199. All those earning more than $1,500
per annum will accumulate excessive reserves.
M. A. Linton, vice-president of the Actuarial Society of Amer
ica and actuarial counsel to the president’s committee on economic
security, states :*

“Another interesting question connected with the actuarial
balance of the system has to do with the 6% tax rate that is to
be reached in 1949 and then maintained indefinitely applying to
all new entrants, most of whom will be under 20 years of age.
This 6% rate is considerably above the true figure for these
young entrants taken by themselves as it has been necessary to
overcharge them in order to make up for the unearned pensions
that will be paid to those who are included in the system at its
* Reserve Provisions of the Federal Old Age Security Program, M. Albert Linton; Vol. 36,
Part 2, No. 94, p. 370, Transactions—Actuarial Society of America.
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inauguration. Will this situation prove to be stable or is there
likely to be political agitation to shift the excess cost over to the
general revenue fund of the government? Eventually, of course,
after the excess cost has been liquidated it will be possible to
support the system by a tax rate that is less than 6%. How
ever, that will be many years hence, and in the meantime there
will be ample opportunity for difficulties to arise with the higherthan-necessary rate for young entrants.”
Another point which must be classified under disadvantages is
that the cost of taking care of aged people would appear to be no
less under the retirement reserve plan after all these complica
tions have been overcome than it would be on a straightforward
pay-as-you-go plan raising the necessary taxes as they are needed.
The coverage of the old-age benefit law, as has been stated, was
about 26 million on the basis of the 1930 census, or some 53% of
the 49 million gainfully occupied. Using survivorship ratios for
white males, there would be living in the year 1980 approximately
8,400,000 of the original 49 million, 53% of whom would be draw
ing pensions, some 4½ million—let us say 5 million at the
outside. The population in 1980 aged 65 and over is estimated to
be 17 million.* Therefore, 12 million are not eligible under the
old-age benefit plan. On the basis of 50% dependency (assumed
in the report of the senate finance committee) 6 million people
will require old-age assistance, which at $400 per annum plus 5%
for administration will cost $2,520,000,000.
The old-age benefit payments in 1980 are estimated to be 3½
billion dollars.† Against this the interest on the reserve is esti
mated to amount to 1.4 billion, but as previously explained this is
not apt to be realized, and the annual interest cost not “saved”
will probably amount to 1 billion, leaving the old-age benefit
cost at about 3 billion dollars.
This brings the total cost of taking care of all aged 65 and over
who need aid or come under the benefit plan to about 5½ billion
dollars per annum.
On the other hand, we could provide for 11 million aged persons
(the same number) at $480 per annum at an annual cost of 5½
billion dollars including 5% administration, without any retire
ment reserve.
Nothing is to be gained in reduction in cost by entering upon the
unknown risks of establishing a reserve of 47 billion dollars. It
* Supplement to Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, January
15, 1935, p. 12, Government Printing Office, Washington.
† Report of Senate Finance Committee, May 20,1935, p. 9.
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may be said that without the accumulation of contributions the
burden would be left to future generations. Where does it rest
now? The only change in status under the reserve plan is to
substitute the state for the family, and we might well pause be
fore we sponsor such a fundamental change.
Weighing all these considerations one wonders whether it
would not be far better to make whatever may be determined
to be adequate provision for old age by straight pay-as-you-go
means, or if a retirement reserve is to be used, through a modest
one supplemented by the pay-as-you-go means.
As a matter of policy, are we satisfied that we have reached
the point at which state paternalism is to operate to such an
extent that it shall become a matter of public rather than private
interest and obligation to provide an income for half the popula
tion aged 65 and over? If so, we must also contemplate that it
will not be long before we shall have to provide similarly for the
other half, and probably not long after that before the limit will
be 60 rather than 65. It is a step that we must ponder well.
There does not seem to be an immediate actual need for it.
Reference is made in the report of the senate finance committee
to the condition that something over one million aged persons
were in need of assistance and to the estimated present population
aged 65 and over of some
millions. These figures show no
such present heavy ratio of need as to require such a broad pro
gram, and we should not lose all sense of this as we bow before
the forces which our economic struggle has stirred up.
One could fill many pages on this theme, but perhaps it is just
as well to leave it for another time. Let us pass to consideration
of the unemployment-compensation plan.

Unemployment Compensation
The unemployment-compensation part of the social-security
program, federal and state, is filled with a multitude of complexi
ties of policy and administration, as might be expected. A synop
sis of the main features of the laws will serve and avoid much
puzzling.
Employees who lose their jobs are entitled to unemployment
compensation under certain conditions. The coverage, that is to
say the occupations included and excluded, are substantially
the same in the federal act as for old-age benefits, except that
casual labor is not exempt. The state laws which have been
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passed add a variety of other exemptions. Uniformly an im
portant characteristic of eligibility is employment. Those pres
ently unemployed can become eligible only after they are re
employed.
Certain stipulations are made as to the relation of benefit to
pay, the duration of benefit to duration of employment, the
length of the waiting period between loss of employment and
commencement of benefit, etc. State unemployment laws are
subject to acceptability under the federal law, which contains
certain minimum requirements. One of these is that benefits
shall not begin until two years after inauguration of a state plan.
This is essential in order to accumulate a reserve, but it is inter
esting, although a digression, that the requirement may have op
erated to retard parallel action on the part of states (aside from
state constitutional bars), because there is nothing lost, rather
something gained, in waiting for a year on the chance that
constitutionality of the law may be tested, when it is plain that
reserves at higher tax rates for two years will accumulate more
rapidly.
The money is to come from taxes levied on employers of eight
or more persons. Here, as in the case of the old-age benefit taxes,
the revenues are explicitly separate in the federal act, but prac
tically this does not alter the purpose. The definitions of em
ployers vary in some state laws and in some states employees
are also called upon to contribute.
The federal act provides for the remission of 90% of the federal
tax in states having conforming laws.
Reserve funds are required to be lodged with the federal gov
ernment. They are to be accumulated out of the excess of
revenue over early demands for compensation, but the reserves
are not expected to rise like the old-age retirement reserve.
Consideration of the unemployment compensation program
divides into questions of policy and questions of method. The
wisdom of undertaking to develop some machinery for the allevi
ation of unpreventable unemployment is generally accepted in
principle. Prior to the slump, leading manufacturers had already
begun experimentation on their own account with various plans,
but these naturally fell, under the extraordinary need which
developed. It should be said here parenthetically that such plans
were not intended to cope with a major depression, nor is it the
idea in a program of unemployment compensation on a nationally
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coordinated scale to provide a remedy for emergencies. Unem
ployment compensation is intended for interim relief during what
may be termed more or less normal unemployment swings, and
when this relief is exhausted because of the severity of conditions
it is the intention to turn again to public works for extended
relief.
Thus there really are no questions of policy. The trend has
clearly been toward recognition of a social responsibility for the
unemployment problem. The main bar to state action was the
competitive disadvantage of individual action. The federal act
is designed to furnish the stimulus for concerted state action and
the means for coordination. Now is the best time for such
action, the potential demands upon the first fund being pre
sumably at their lowest, because those whose jobs have lasted
until now are least likely to become applicants for benefits. The
desirability of doing something is clear. The questions and the
problems all relate to what is to be done and how it is to be done.
Questions as to method undoubtedly will be answerable much
better a few years hence, after we shall have had the experience
of the initial trials. Therefore it is a virtue in the present pro
gram that latitude in the development of methods in the respec
tive states is definitely planned. To be sure, this also brings on a
tremendous confusion of pattern (see schedule “ 3 ”) but this seems
unavoidable and possibly is not entirely disadvantageous. At
any rate the dangers ahead do not loom as large as those in the
old-age benefit program. One might wish that we had confined
our first attempt at social security to the problems of unemploy
ment and state aid, as indeed there is reason to believe was the
original aim.
There appear now to be four major aspects to the unemploy
ment-compensation program. These are (1) the need for or
ganization, (2) development of the best type of method, (3)
determination of the desirability of merit ratings and (4) an
effective approach to the social problems remaining which are
not comprised in the present scope.
Clearly, if we are to deal with the unemployment problem we
must build an organization and a technique which can be nation
ally coordinated. As a single employer could not hope to deal
successfully with the problem when it gets beyond the confines
of his own resources, so we could not hope to reach a solution in
a single state. The condition of unemployment when it becomes
270

Social Security

acute is not local to a state.
say on this subject:*

O. C. Richter and W. R. Williamson

“The complexity of the causes of unemployment make the
application of thorough-going remedies difficult. The implica
tion of the Wisconsin reserve plan that the individual employer
can control employment within his plant so as to maintain re
serves indicates that he can determine what causes unemploy
ment and can effectually deal with the factors. Each employer
can probably better his administration, improve plant organiza
tion and secure increased morale. He is, however, only part of
the entire social and industrial system. It was clear to the staff
that the individual employer could not do enough in reducing
unemployment to carry out the claim of the individual reserve
advocates as to its Utopian qualities. The social-security point
of view admits the complexity of the problem, aims at a benefit
within narrow limits which shall remove actual want over a
given period of time and still postpones the problem of dealing
with want outside of those limits. The staff and several members
of the advisory council leaned very strongly toward pooled funds
alone and members of the staff who favored a national program
suggested an equalization fund which should make the pool
essentially a national pool rather than a series of state pools.
The narrow plant reserve idea of a very limited liability seemed
too superficial a remedy for so complete a problem.”
We suffer, moreover, from a woeful lack of knowledge of the
unemployment problem, having not even trustworthy statistics
upon the number of unemployed, their age, kind, concentration
and circumstances. The obtaining of such data may well be a
function of organization of no inconsiderable importance.
We have to learn which type of fund may prove most effective.
Three are now being tried, namely, the state pooled fund, the
individual employer’s reserve account and guaranteed employ
ment. The quotation already given from Richter and William
son advocates the pooled fund.
The question whether merit ratings are desirable or undesirable
still being debated. Many of the plans provide for an eventual
reduction in the taxes payable by employers who are successful in
maintaining meritorious records of employment stabilization,
presumably on the theory that an employer who keeps down
unemployment among his own employees should not have to pay
the cost of providing for employers who do not. There are sev* The Social Security Act of 1935 and the Work of the Committee on Economic Security; O. C.
Richter and W. R. Williamson, Vol. 36, Part 2, No. 94, p. 339, Transactions—Actuarial Society
of America.
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eral objections to this reasoning. One is that if such reductions
were made the entire load would fall upon the employers least able
to carry it. Another is that the successful employer is not by
that accomplishment relieved of a general social responsibility,
much in the same way that we who do not break the law must
pay taxes to support an organization to maintain the law.
The social problems remaining outside the scope of the present
program will have to be met before very long. The present un
employed must be put back to work. Seasonal and part-time
workers can not be provided for adequately in the present plans.
Tremendous numbers of workers are excluded by the classification
in the laws. Agricultural workers, for example, are omitted,
probably largely because of the difficulty of including them in an
administrative scheme. We would require employment offices
on wheels to reach them and keep track of them. Domestic
service is excluded. One can imagine the difficulties of collecting
taxes from housewives or judging the vicissitudes of unemploy
ment and migration amongst workers in domestic service.
Finally, there remains to be solved, not the less important be
cause the last mentioned, the great question of the dole, the pay
ment of extended benefits after the statutory benefits have been
exhausted, a situation with which great difficulty was had in
Great Britain. As has been mentioned, it is the idea in such a
situation to revert to public works, and it may be that the
development of a suitable organization will enable this, but it
will be accomplished by no means so easily as the idea is expressed.
What would be the alternatives to the present program for
dealing with the problems of unemployment? Would one of the
alternatives be letting nature take its course, as we have done,
until conditions become unbearable and we are forced to take
emergency steps? This, as we should know, may be more costly
in every way than the proposed program.
A method, which has been discussed as an alternative, requiring
an employer as an obligation of employment to pay a dismissal
wage more or less equivalent to unemployment compensation has
interesting possibilities. It has, however, some obvious difficul
ties, such as first obtaining national legislation to establish the
obligation and, next, seeing to the enforcement of it.
All in all, unemployment compensation is plainly a prob
lem with which we have to wrestle and the sensible way is to
get at it.
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State Grants-in-Aid

The remaining social part of the security program provides for
federal grants to the states of diverse amounts to further the wel
fare of mothers and children, to assist the blind and to advance
public health research and activities. The nature of these is
quite plain enough for the present purpose (see schedule “1”)
and the amounts involved are small in comparison with the oldage benefit and unemployment-compensation measures. The
old-age assistance grants are to be applied to the benefit of those
elderly persons in need who are not eligible under the retirement
reserve plan. These grants may be excluded here from these
comments because they have already been discussed in preceding
paragraphs. The amounts to be appropriated for the state grants
by the federal government require to be matched by the states
with equal or greater amounts except as to public health services.
One can find little to quarrel with in the objectives of these
activities. We are dealing here with the alleviation of actual
suffering, with improvement in the conditions of the handicapped
and with raising the standards of health, and that these are things
we have to do probably no one would deny. It is logical that we
may do them better under the stimulus and facilitation of a
nationally concerted program than we are now doing on an aver
age under individual state programs, which now probably vary
considerably both as to adequacy of resources and adequacy of
measures. The annual cost of an orderly national plan is a small
item in the total and if well administered may prove to be money
wisely spent.
We pass now to the fourth part of the program, namely the
administration of the principal measures for old-age pensions and
for unemployment compensation.
Administration

The task of administering the provisions of the old-age pension
plan is extraordinary. Even the initial step of preparing to ad
minister the law is staggering. Imagine the difficulties of com
piling fundamental data, comparable in part at least to the data
required by life-insurance companies, upon some 26 million
workers scattered through some 3 million square miles of conti
nental United States. This has to be accomplished by 1938 if
the annual report required by the act upon the actuarial status
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of the fund is to be rendered to the congress. It is true that
benefit payments do not start until 1942 and that then these will
only go to a small percentage of the total number of persons.
Nevertheless it will be necessary to establish their identities and,
what may in cases prove even more difficult, their ages.
After the work of preparation, an organization with machinery
must be built to keep track of all persons eligible for old-age
benefits currently or at some future time. This will mean the
keeping of upwards of 30 million individual accounts. The trans
actions to be recorded in these accounts would consist of at least
one annual entry of each person’s wages. Actually this would
probably amount to one and a fraction entries when changes in
employment are taken into account. Next there would be a
transaction authorizing the payment of monthly pensions ulti
mately to some 5 million persons. Assuming that the monthly
details are kept on record in the decentralized public employment
offices through which payment is intended to be made, according
to the report of the president’s committee on economic security,
these transactions will require at least another record in the
federal accounts. Then deaths will have to be recorded and
a settlement in final adjustment of the decedent’s account will
have to be made. These will probably run to about 1,200 a day.
Truly, it will have to be an accounting system on a magnificent
scale.
Of course, to be fair we must admit that the mere clerical re
cording of these transactions is an operation that we are well
equipped in technical knowledge and in the development of
mechanical devices to carry out with efficiency and economy,
given an opportunity for proper organization and freedom from
political bureaucracy. However, we probably shall not be able
to reach in government administration the same degree of effec
tiveness that we have in the accounting administration of private
enterprises.
The form of administration of the unemployment compensation
plan is primarily one of state management. It probably will be
no less a problem because of this decentralization, inasmuch as
the detail required will be greater, although the number of persons
involved is probably about three-quarters as large and the num
ber of current beneficiaries is substantially smaller. We shall
probably be doing well if we keep the cost of administration
within 10% of the tax revenues for this purpose.
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A new department of administration is begun with the estab
lishment of federal and state affiliated employment offices. Un
der the Wagner-Peyser act each state is to receive, according to
certain conditions, an allotment of federal funds through the
United States employment service. Under this plan there are
already about 250 state employment offices. Also, we now have
in addition to the 250 offices established under the WagnerPeyser act some 1,250 branch offices for carrying on the emergency
functions of the national reemployment service. These are for
placing workers on public-works projects, and for this purpose the
nation is divided into about 465 districts comprising usually
several counties. It is to be expected that in order to carry out
the provisions of the federal social-security act and the parallel
state acts it will be necessary to extend public employment offices.
This is intimated in the report of the president’s committee on
economic security:*

“The employment service, however, will have to be still further
expanded and improved if the measures for economic security
we have suggested are to be put into efficient operation. It is
through the employment offices that the unemployment compen
sation benefits and also the old-age annuities are to be paid. These
offices must function as efficient placement agencies if the ‘wil
lingness-to-work ’ test of eligibility for benefits in unemployment
compensation is to be made effective. They now function to
select the employees on public-works projects and should have a
similar relation to any expanded public-employment program.
Above all, the employment offices should strive to become genuine
clearing houses for all labor, at which all unemployed workers will
be registered and to which employers will naturally turn when
seeking employees.
“To perform these important functions, a nation-wide system
of employment offices is vital. The nucleus for such a system
exists in the United States employment service and the national
reemployment service, which have always been combined ‘at
headquarters’ and are now being consolidated in states where
both have existed. No fundamental change in the relation of the
federal and state governments to the employment offices is
deemed necessary, but some amendment of the Wagner-Peyser
act is needed to enable the employment offices to perform all the
functions our program contemplates. The larger funds required
will come from the portion of the federal payroll tax retained for
administrative purposes.
“Closely related to the development of a more efficient employ* Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, January 15, 1935, p.
46, 47.
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ment service is the federal regulation of private employment
agencies doing an interstate business. The interstate business
of such private agencies can not be regulated by the states, and,
for the protection no less of the reputable agencies than of the
workers, should be strictly regulated by the federal government.”

Manifestly, such offices must be within reasonable distance of
the employees who are to be served. One can not expect a man
out of a job to walk more than five miles in order to report to
an employment office. An estimate of the number of offices
to which this extension might grow is a matter for speculation.
There are more than 3,000 counties in the United States and it
would take an average of only about 3 offices per county to bring
us close to the guess of 10,000 public employment offices.
These are the outstanding elements of the administrative part
of the program, aside from the one of total annual cost, which has
already been mentioned.
Conclusion
It seems absurd to try to summarize what has been expressed in
the preceding pages of this review. The subject is too big to
permit an article even at this length to be more than a summary
in its entirety. One can epitomize only by saying that the federal
social-security act of 1935 is undoubtedly a momentous develop
ment in our history. Its provisions and requirements are vast
in scope and evolutionary in objectives. Its probable minimum
annual cost at cruising speed will be 7 billion dollars, beyond
which the possibilities depend upon one’s fancy.
Here is a notion, no better founded than 999,999,999 out of
every billion notions. Suppose at some future time that we
should develop a national yearning for the advantages of a social
istic state. What a wonderful start we should have with the
establishment of 10,000 federal administrative offices, a national
pool of 50 billion dollars and a part of the population inured to
the benefits that will emanate from the state. The notion is
probably visionary.
Professor Tugwell is reported in the New York Sun ♦ to have
said in amplifying his belief that government spending is justified
in the sense of investing in the welfare of humanity:

“ I believe in the extension of this investment principle, first in
* Workers and Farmers, Unite, Address of Rexford G. Tugwell, the New York Sun, March 7,
1936, p. 23.
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rescue operations, next in yardstick acquisitions and then in the
complete dominance by the government of suitable areas of
enterprise. I think this will happen ...”
Also:

"For my part I hope our government will never accommodate
itself to the ruthless doctrine of survival; I hope it may continue
to repair whatever ravages of industrial ruthlessness it finds
itself unable to prevent. And I hope the costs will continue to
be assessed upon the profits attributable to our increasing mechan
ical efficiency. For there is where they belong.”

Again, after summarizing what has been done for the farmers:

“And for the workers a similar long list of gains has been
registered. Honest attempts to regulate the hours and condi
tions of work have been made; the labor of women and children
has been curtailed. Serious legal difficulties which have been
interposed against these reforms we have refused to regard as
insuperable. The intention has been made so plain that a new
mandate will certainly result in their establishment and exten
sion.”
And finally:

“Our best strategy is to surge forward with the workers and
the farmers of this nation, committed to general achievements,
but trusting the genius of our leader for the disposition of our
forces and the timing of our attacks. I do not need to remind
you of his genius for this task, nor of his devotion to the cause of
overthrowing industrial autocracy and the creation of the
democratic discipline.”
If an additional example to those given earlier is necessary,
one may turn to the bills that have been introduced in both
houses (Frazier—S. 3475 and Lundeen—H. R. 9680). These
bills propose to establish a national system of social insurance
for the benefit of all workers. The system is to go into immedi
ate operation and provide insurance for all wage earners, all
salaried workers, farmers, professional workers and the self
employed, including those who are at present unemployed or
suffer disability, as well as those who may become unemployed
and may suffer disability in the future. The system is to pro
vide compensation by guaranteeing an income equal to average
earnings (sic) but in no case less than a minimum standard of
living. The minimum is given at $10 a week plus $3 for each
dependent and the maximum at $20 a week plus $5 for each de
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pendent. There are provisions for aged persons 60 years old
and over. There is one for the self-employed worker equal to
the difference between his average weekly net earnings and the
minimum compensation. Lastly, the costs of the system are to
be a primary charge on the national wealth and are to be a com
ponent element of the budget of the federal government, to be
provided out of the national treasury. Any additional costs
necessitated by the system are to be derived, by suitable revenue
legislation, from high incomes, corporate surpluses and other
accumulated wealth and are not to be placed directly by payroll
taxes or indirectly by sales taxes upon the workers of the United
States, whose standard of living the measure seeks to protect.
It is to be hoped, of course, that these bills will never be re
ported out and it may be that reference to them here may err
by exaggeration. If so, the error may be excusable if emphasis
is thereby laid upon the gravity of the considerations that are
before us for decision in our social-security program.
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Schedule
Appropriations Authorized in the Federal Social Security Act of 1935 and
Those Recommended by the Committee on Appropriations January 21, 1936
Amounts rec
ommended by
Amounts author committee on
ized in the social appropriations
security act for report Jan. 21,
1936
1936 for 1936
(a)
(c)
Social security board—
Grants to states:
Unemployment (administration) (title III).....................
$ 4,000,000 (d) $ 2,250,000
24,660,000
49,750,000
Old age assistance (title I).................................................
5,000,000
24,750,000
Dependent children (title IV)............................................
2,000,000
3,000,000
Aid to the blind (title X)...................................................
$ 81,500,000
530,000 (b)

$33,910,000
1,000,000

Total, social-security board................................................

$ 82,030,000

$34,910,000

Treasury department: public health service—
Grants to states (title VI—sec. 601)........................................
Administration and research (title VI—sec. 603)...................

$ 8,000,000
2,000,000

$ 3,333,000
375,000

Total, public health service................................................

$ 10,000,000

$ 3,708,000

Department of labor: children’s bureau—
Grants to states:
Maternal and child health (title V—part 1).......................
Crippled children (title V—part 2).......................................
Child-welfare (title V—part 3)..............................................

$ 3,800,000
2,850,000
1,500,000

$ 1,580,000
1,187,000
625,000

Total, grants.........................................................................
Administration (title V—part 5)...............................................

$ 8,150,000
425,000

$ 3,392,000
150,000

Total, children’s bureau......................................................

$ 8,575,000

$ 3,542,000

Total, grants.........................................................................
Administration (titles I, IV, VII and X).................................

Department of the interior: office of education—
Grants to states—vocational rehabilitation (title V—part 4)
Administration (title V—part 4). ...........................................

$

841,000
22,000

$

350,000
4,500

Total, office of education....................................................

$

863,000

$

354,500

$

150,000

Department of commerce: bureau of the census—
Administration

Grand total (before including administration allowance
in old-age benefit plan, running ultimately to about
$100,000,000—see schedule "2”)..............................

$101,468,000

$42,664,500

(a) Fiscal year ending June 30th.
(b) The act authorized $530,000 for administration of old-age assistance, dependent children
and aid to the blind, as included herein, and an indeterminate amount for the social
security board, which is not included herein.
(c) H. R. 10,464 for fiscal year to June 30th. The original bill (H. R. 9,215) having failed to pass
at the 1st session of the 74th congress, some of the amounts now cover only five months
instead of ten months’ requirements.
(d) For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, and each fiscal year thereafter, the amount for
grants to states for unemployment compensation administration is $49,000,000—increase
of $45,000,000.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

99
107
110

960
1,000

91

83
88

748
788
817
888

To old-age
reserve fund
596
513
831
662
876 (1946) 1,137
908 (1951) 1,783
987 (d)
1,939
1,067 (d)
2,095
1.110(d)
2,180

Total
(f)

(Millions of dollars)

1,877
2,041
2,205
2,295

60
94
102
110
115

560

Total
715
1,197

47
53

For federal
administra
tion
(b)

Old-age
benefit tax

1,049
1,410
1,925
2,600
2,827
3,055
3,180

Funds

107
136
148
185
201
217
225

Adminis
tration

Grand total

1,156
1,546
2,073
2,785
3,028
3,272
3,405

Com
bined

Schedule "2 ”

Fiscal year ending June 30th.
Administration allowance taken as the difference between revenue estimates and appropriations for the reserve, until 1950, and thereafter at 5% of total tax.
Minimum federal retention.
Based on ratio of growth in old-age benefit total tax.
Figures taken from report of senate finance committee, May 20, 1935.
Unemployment tax revenue estimates were based on four or more employees. The act as passed covering eight or more would reduce these figures slightly.

(a) ......................................................
1940............................................................
1945............................................................
1950............................................................
1960............................................................
1970............................................................
1980..............................................................

1938

To state
For state
unemploy administra
ment trust
tion
funds
(10%)
(90%)
(c)
536
60

Unemployment
compensation tax

E stimated R evenues from P ayroll T axes under F ederal Social S ecurity Act (e)
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(upon proclamation)

U tah

Oregon
(November 16, 1935)

(November 15, 1935)

N ew H ampshire

Alabama
(September 14, 1935)

(August 28, 1935)

D istrict of C olumbia

(August 14, 1935)

W ashington

California
(August 14, 1935)

(August 13, 1935)

M assachusetts

(April 25, 1935)

N ew Y ork

(July 1, 1934)

W isconsin

(August 14, 1935)

F ederal Act (Title IX)

Federal or state law
(date of law)

2
3

1

Bb

Ba, C

De

4 or more

Commission will rule

Bd

0 to 3 Db

—
—
—
E

1936
1937
1938

3
3

L

4 or more on 13 days in 13 weeks
in calendar year
K, L

calendar year
L

or more

8 or more in each of 20 weeks in

1

4 or more on 20 days in 20 weeks
in calendar year

Gb

Weekly within 8 days following
(unless special permission oth 
erwise)

Commission will rule

Monthly, not later than 15th of
month following

L

4 or more in each of 13 weeks in
calendar year

Commission will rule, but not
prior to March 1, 1936

to 3 Db
Bc , D c

1
1
1

0.5

1
1

1

1

—
—
—
—

Commission will rule

in calendar year

8 or more on 20 days in 20 weeks

L

calendar year

8 or more in each of 20 weeks in

4 or more in each of 13 weeks in
calendar year
L

L

calendar year

8 or more in each of 18 weeks in

8 or more on 20 days in 20 weeks
in calendar year

Applies to employers of —
Persons

—
—
—
—

1

2
3

1

1½ to 4 Db
0.9
1.8
2.7
1 ½ to 4 Db

3

2

1

1

1

1

Gb

1
1

0.9

0.45
Commission ruled tentatively,
July 15, 1936, for 6 months to
June 30th, thereafter monthly
(unless special permission oth
erwise)

Commission will rule

—
Ga

1

Commission will rule, but not
prior to April 1, 1936

Monthly —in following month

—
—
—

—
—
—
—
E

January 31st following—single
or quarterly payment

Returns due and contributions
payable (F)

1936
0.9
1937
1.8
1938
2.7
1941 0.7 to 4.7 Db

1936
1937
1938
1941

1936
1937
1938
1941

1936
1937
1938
1941

Db

3 H
1 to 3 H

1 to

3
1941 Min. 2

1936
1937
1938

1936
0.9
1937
1.8
1938
2.7
1941 1 to 2.7% Db

1936
1 M
1937
2 M
1938
3 M
1941 Min. 1 Db
Bc , D c

1936
1937
1938

2
2

0 to 2.7 Db
0 to 4 Db

1936
1937
1938
1939

Da, Daa

1%
2
3

1936
1937
1938

—
—
—

Contribution rates: % of wages
Employer's Employee’s
contribution contribution

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS
Summary of basic provisions of federal and state acts as to contributions and coverage

A-22, A-23, A-27

A-1, A-6, A-8, A-20, A-21,

A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5,
A-6, A-7, A-9

A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7,
A-8, A-17, A-19

A-6, A-7

A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5,

A-11

A-2, A-4, A-5, A-9, A-10,

A-7, A-27

A-6, A-7, A-8

A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5,

A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15,
A-16

A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7,

A-1, A-4a, A-6, A-7, A-27

A-12, A-18, A-24, A-25,
A-26, A-27

A-1, A-2, A-6a, A-7, A-8,

A-6, A-7

A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5,

Exempt employments

Schedule “ 3 ”

Social Security
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A: Exempt
A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
A-4a
A-5
A-6
A-6a
A-7
A-8
A-9
A-10

A-11
A-12
A-13

A-14
A-1S
A-16
A-17
A-18
A-19
A-20

A-21
A-22
A-23
A-24
A-25
A-26
A-27

Notes—Schedule “3”
employments:
Agricultural labor.
Domestic service in a private home.
Officer or crew of vessel on U. S. navigable waters.
Parents, spouse or minor child of employer.
Spouse or minor child.
Employees of federal government or instrumentality thereof.
Employees of state government or instrumentality thereof.
Governmental employees on an annual salary.
Employees of non-profit religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational or
humane organizations.
Employment under any direct U. S. unemployment compensation system.
Casual labor not in course of employer's business.
Employees of a senator, representative, delegate or resident commissioner in
legislative service.
District school officers or teachers, policemen, firemen, and persons subject to civilservice act 1920.
Employees on governmental relief project approved by commission.
Employment on commission basis where employee is own master and earnings
depend on his own efforts.
Share fishermen wholly paid by share.
Piece work done at home.
Casual employees of 4 weeks or less.
Officers or teachers in public or private schools or colleges.
Teachers in public or private schools or colleges for the regular term.
Physicians and nurses in public or private hospitals.
Employment not in usual course of business or occupation carried on by employer
for profit.
Members of immediate family of employer.
Employees of a common carrier subject to emergency railroad transportation act.
Seasonal employment, i.e., less than 12 weeks in year.
Elected or appointed public officers.
Employees of railroads or logging operations (optional).
Employees of state fair, Wisconsin national guard or conservation commission for
emergency fire fighting.
Although federal employees (A-5) are not specifically exempt, it may be super
fluous on the ground state can not tax federal government.

B: Excluded employees (although included to derive number of employees):
Ba $250.00 a month or more, until December 31, 1936.
Bb $50.00 a week or $2,600.00 per annum or more.
Bc $2,500.00 per annum or more.
Bd $2,000.00 per annum or more.
C: Plus state assessment up to 0.2% for administration.

D: Merit ratings or credits:
Da Subject to credit for contributions paid to states, up to 90% of federal tax.
Daa After 1937, the 90% federal credit is obtainable in full, notwithstanding employer
may pay a lower state rate through merit classification.
Db Rate depends on merit classification or status of reserve.
Dc Higher rate may be set if necessitated by chronic or excessive unemployment.

E: Voluntary employee contributions permitted to secure increased benefits.
F: Liability for contributions begins in all cases on January 1, 1936, excepting Wisconsin, July
1, 1934.

G: Employee’s contributions:
Ga Equal to
of employer’s contribution for employee.
Gb Not to exceed 50% of employer’s rate.

H: 1936 and 1937 rates variable with federal reserve board’s adjusted index of total industrial
production.
K: The 4 employees must be employed at the same time.

L: Law includes sub-contractors' clause, holding employer of sub-contractor responsible in the
absence of due assumption of contribution responsibility by sub-contractor.

M: Less any amount not credited by federal law. The maximum reduction would be to 0.9%,
1.8% and 2.7% in cases where the entire payroll is in wages below $2,500.00 per annum.
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